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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Case No. 900552-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
ANA LILIA GONZALES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1990), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Was there sufficient evidence that defendant acted 
with intent to defraud when she wrote and tendered for value a 
check belonging to another? Evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. "[A jury conviction may be 
reversed] for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
2. Did the trial court properly exclude testimony 
corroborative of defendant's prior testimony on the issue of 
defendant's intent to defraud? A trial court's ruling on 
evidentiary matters is reviewed only for a clear abuse of 
discretion and will not be interfered with unless there is the 
likelihood that injustice resulted. State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 
603, 604 (Utah 1985).l 
3. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence 
the checkbook from which defendant wrote the check forming the 
basis of the forgery charge, offered as circumstantial evidence 
of her acting with intent to defraud? Because this question 
concerns the admissibility of evidence it should be reviewed 
under the standard set forth in paragraph 2, above. 
4. Did the trial court properly refuse defendant's 
jury instruction on reasonable doubt? "An appeal challenging the 
refusal to give jury instructions presents a question of law 
1
 Defendant indicates that the appropriate standard of review 
for issues two and three is that applied to assignments of 
constitutional error, to wit: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Appellant's brief at 2, par. 2 and 3). However, evidentiary 
standards and constitutional guarantees are not necessarily 
coextensive. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-5 (Utah 1987) 
(limitation on defendant's right to cross-examine not necessarily 
coextensive with defendant's constitutional right of 
confrontation). Here, defendant has not suggested that the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings have constitutional dimension, nor has 
defendant briefed the issue. 
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only. Therefore, . . . no particular deference to the trial 
court's rulings [is granted]". State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 
1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ana Lilia Gonzalez, was charged by 
information with forgery, a second degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 6-7). Following a trial by jury she 
was convicted and sentenced to a term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years, but was granted a stay and placed on 
probation (R. 79-80). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undisputed testimony was that on January 21, 1990, 
at the Smith's food store located at Eighth South and Ninth East, 
Salt Lake City, defendant purchased goods worth $262.28 with a 
check written in the amount of $300.00 on an account belonging to 
a Christy Lynn Cotner (T. 44-48, 113-16 and State's exhibit 1). 
In defense of her conduct defendant testified that on the 
preceding evening she attended a party in Salt Lake City where 
she first met a Sherry or Shannon O'Neill (T. 108). O'Neill, 
somewhat intoxicated, bragged that her sister loaned O'Neill her 
checks for O'Neill to use in explaining how she had obtained an 
outfit that defendant admired (T. 108-9). Later in the evening 
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defendant loaned O'Neill "a couple bucks" with the understanding 
that O'Neill would repay her. O'Neill was unable to repay 
defendant that evening and so defendant returned the following 
morning (T. 109-10). Still without cash and needing some 
groceries, O'Neill requested defendant pick up some items for her 
and suggested that defendant write a check to cover the amount 
owed (T. 111-12). 
Defendant was accompanied to the Smith's by two men and 
a woman and her child (T.112). Defendant testified that the 
three adults accompanying her selected many items from all around 
the store, explaining to defendant that they would repay O'Neill, 
but that she selected nothing for herself (T. 113-15). Following 
the tally of items, defendant testified, she wrote on the check 
the amount of $300.00, the date and the payee's name, "Smith's". 
Defendant also testified O'Neill, and not she, had earlier signed 
the check at defendant's insistence (T. 116-17). 
Christina Taylor, cashier, testified that she 
particularly noticed that the items purchased by defendant and 
her companions were expensive and unusual, consisting largely of 
makeup, vitamins, cigarettes and body building things (T. 45, 
56). When the items had been tallied, defendant asked one of her 
male companions how much she should write the check for, and he 
suggested that she make it for $300.00, which would leave about 
$37.00 in cash (T. 47). Taylor testified that defendant then 
wrote the check to Smith's for $300.00, signed and dated it, tore 
it from a checkbook which was contained in a wallet and handed it 
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to her along with Cotner's check guarantee VISA card and Smith's 
casher card (T. 48, 144-45 and State's Exhibits 2 and 3). 
Taylor, considering that there might be a problem with the 
transaction because of the unusual purchases, then gave the check 
to Richard Anderson, on-duty manager, for verfication (T. 56-
57).2 
Both Taylor and Anderson testified that defendant just 
stood at the checkout counter, making no attempt to leave the 
store, even while Anderson hollered for assistance to prevent 
defendant's companions from exiting the store with the bagged 
items or while he escorted her to his office (T. 58, 70-73). 
However, Anderson also testifed that he did not believe that 
defendant could have escaped from the time he had decided that 
the check was a forgery because of the manpower that he had 
summoned (T. 74). Following Anderson's verifying telephone call, 
2
 Anderson may also have witnessed defendant sign the check, 
but the record is unclear on this point: 
[Prosecutor]: Why don't you describe to the 
jury what you were doing when you first 
observed Ms. Gonzalez? 
[Anderson]: I was just walking by the 
checkstand and Christina was ringing up the 
order. I went in, finished bagging for her, 
put the stuff in the cart, you know, and she 
was finished writing her signature on the 
check and Christina wanted me to okay it, so, 
you know, she ripped it out and I looked at it 
and for the amount, you know, and all she had, 
she didn't have a driver's license, just a 
guarantee card, so we questioned it. 
(T. 62). 
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Cotner appeared at Smith's and identified the wallet, checkbook, 
VISA and Smith's cards used by defendant as her own (T. 62-63, 
77). Cotner testified that the day before she had lost her purse 
containing the items used by defendant in a store at a mall where 
she noticed the same man who was with defendant at Smith's. She 
did not, however, see defendant at the mall the day before (T. 
76-77, 79, 88-89). Cotner also testified that she had never met 
defendant before nor authorized defendant to use her name, 
guarantee card or checking account (T. 79). 
Salt Lake City police officer Jason Snow interviewed 
defendant at Smith's concerning this incident (T. 90-91). He 
testified that during his interview of defendant and following 
the giving of appropriate Miranda warnings, defendant stated that 
she had received the checkbook from O'Neill who had told her that 
she (O'Neill) had "passed" a few checks around town and that 
defendant should try it (T. 92, 96-98). 
Defendant testified that she had no idea that there was 
a problem in filling in the check while she was doing it and that 
she was not trying to defraud either Smith's or Cotner (T. 123). 
In support both defendant and her mother, Margarita Gonzalez, 
testified that on a few occasions about one and one-half years 
prior, when defendant was seventeen years old, Margarita gave 
defendant permission to use her checkbook and to sign her name in 
purchasing some personal items (T. 105-6, 132-34). 
At trial the State offered Cotner's checkbook as 
evidence of defendant's culpable state of mind (T. 79). The 
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trial court received the evidence over defendant's objection (T. 
80-5 and State's Exhibit 4). Also, the trial court sustained the 
State's objection to the testimony of Jeff Phillips, offered to 
corroborate defendant's rendition of O'Neill's statement about 
the checkbook and to thus establish defendant's innocent state of 
mind when she subsequently wrote the check (T. 162-63).3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The State provided sufficient evidence on which the 
jury could find defendant guilty. That evidence consisted most 
substantially of two witnesses' testimony that defendant signed a 
check on a stranger's account, a point defendant concedes for the 
purposes of appeal, plus a police officer's testimony that 
defendant told him that she had received the checkbook from 
O'Neill with the suggestion that defendant also try "passing" 
some checks. The jury might also have reasonably doubted 
defendant's story and believed other circumstantial evidence 
offered to prove defendant's culpable state of mind. 
POINT II 
The trial court acted within its discretion in refusing 
to admit the testimony of defense witness Phillips. Rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and federal and Utah case law provide for 
the exclusion of cumulative testimony in appropriate cases. The 
3
 Phillips was, however, permitted to testify that he did hear 
O'Neill make a statement about a checkbook and that defendant was 
in O'Neill's immediate vicinity when the statement was made 
(T. 137-38). 
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testimony was cumulative of that previously given by defendant. 
Even if it was error to exclude the witness's testimony as to 
what he heard O'Neill say about the checkbook that error was 
harmless because (1) the witness was allowed to testify to 
substantially the same matter that defendant had previously 
testified to; (2) the excluded testimony could not have 
established defendant's innocent state of mind; and (3) there was 
no evidence that the jury was misled by not hearing the excluded 
testimony. 
POINT III 
The trial court properly admitted the stolen checkbook 
into evidence. Defendant's possession of a stolen checkbook was 
relevant to establishing defendant's culpable state of mind, to 
wit: that in writing a check belonging to Cotner she acted with 
purpose to defraud Smith's and Cotner. The probative value of 
defendant's possession of a stolen checkbook was not outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice because proof of defendant's 
culpable state of mind required the marshalling of all available 
evidence while, on the other hand, defendant was unable to show 
that the admission of the checkbook misled the jury in its 
consideration of the evidence. Also, the State stated to the jury 
in closing that defendant was not charged with theft or anything 
other than forgery, and the trial court's instructions 
effectively reinforced that statement. 
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POINT IV 
The reasonable doubt instruction used in this trial is 
precisely that recently approved in State v. Pederson, 802 P. 2d 
1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The instruction contains none of the 
language found objectionable in the instruction found 
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990), 
and is otherwise similar to that considered in Cage but not 
regarded as objectionable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT DEFENDANT SIGNED A 
CHECK ON THE ACCOUNT OF A STRANGER AND THAT 
SHE KNEW THAT THE CHECKBOOK HAD BEEN USED TO 
"PASS" CHECKS, ALONG WITH REASONABLE 
INFERENCES STEMMING FROM DEFENDANT'S 
BEHAVIOR, WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT 
ACTED WITH A PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD. 
Defendant claims that the State failed to prove that 
her writing a check to Smith's food store on an account belonging 
to Cotner was undertaken with a purpose to defraud. When 
reviewing a conviction by a jury, an appellate court "do[es] not 
substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury. 'It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses.'" State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 
229, 231 (Utah 1980)). The court Mreview[s] the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). Viewing the evidence of this case in 
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the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the State clearly 
provided sufficient evidence to prove that defendant did act with 
intent to defraud when she attempted to pass Cotner's check at 
Smith's Food King. 
Two witnesses testified that defendant, contrary to her 
testimony, signed the check in question using the name of Christy 
Cotner, the true owner of the account (T. 62, 145). Cotner 
testified that defendant was unknown to her prior to this check 
passing incident and never had her authorization to use her name, 
guarantee card or checking account (T. 79). Officer Snow 
testified that defendant told him that she had received the 
checkbook from O'Neill who stated that she (O'Neill) had "passed" 
some of the checks around town and that defendant might also try 
doing it (T. 92).A 
The jury might also reasonably have doubted defendant's 
credibility and thereby inferred her guilty state of mind from 
other evidence, particularly that offered by defendant herself. 
Defendant claims that she only wrote the check in reliance on 
O'Neill's apparent authority to authorize such a transaction. 
Yet even a naive individual could not be expected to assume that 
a stranger having apparent authority to use her "sister's" 
A
 On cross-examination, when pressed about whether he might 
have been mistaken about the substance and meaning of defendant's 
statement about her receipt of the checkbook, officer Snow 
testified with assurance that defendant definitely used the word 
"passed" which in that context clearly indicated O'Neill's, and 
consequently defendant's, knowledge that the checks were the 
instruments of forgery (T. 97-98). 
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checkbook could in any proper way transfer that authority to yet 
another stanger, such as defendant. In this sense defendant's 
prior experience in using her mother's checkbook was only 
remotely similar to her use of Cotner's checkbook in this case.5 
5
 Defendant's testimony suggests that her insistence that 
O'Neill sign the check, rather than she who did not have permission 
herself to sign it, is further evidence of her good faith (T. 117). 
However, the jury might reasonably have inferred from this 
circumstance, if true, that defendant was fully aware of the 
wrongfulness of these machinations and simply felt the need to have 
another share in her guilt. Moreover, though defendant argues 
strenuously that she believed O'Neill had authority to use the 
checkbook, the record clearly suggests that she might really have 
been skeptical of such alleged authority: 
[Defense counsel]: And during the time -that 
you were at the party that night, was there 
any conversation that came up about a 
checkbook that Shannon or Sherry O'Neill had? 
[Defendant]: Miss O'Neill was a little more 
intoxicated than other people that were there 
and she was really loud, kind of the scene of 
the whole party, and she was — I liked her 
outfit that she had and the girls that were 
there were asking her where she had gotten it 
from and she started bragging how her sister 
loaned her her checks for her to use and we 
were just kind of — well, we were kind of 
surprised because my sister wouldn't do that 
and exceed Tsicl over a lot of checks, as many 
as she said that she did. 
[Defense counsel]: So she'd given you the 
impression that she'd been able to use that 
checkbook — 
[Defendant]: Yes. 
[Defense counsel]: — to buy stuff? 
[Defendant]: Yes. 
[Prosecution]: I'll object as leading, your 
Honor. 
(continued...) 
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Defendant argues that her remaining by the checkout 
stand while the check was being verified, without an attempt to 
flee then or while she was being escorted to the manager's 
office, evidences her innocent state of mind. However, Anderson 
testified that defendant could not have escaped from the store 
once he determined the check was a forgery (T. 74).6 Thus, in 
the jury's eyes, defendant's apparently reserved demeanor may 
simply have reflected a realistic assessment of a rapidly 
deteriorating situation. 
Defendant also cites authority for the proposition that 
the State has the burden of proving in a forgery case that the 
defendant not only used the name of another but that he did so 
without authority. See State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1317-18 
(Utah 1979). In fact Collins generally stands for precisely the 
opposite proposition since, as the case points out, section 76-6-
501 was amended so as to require a showing of conduct undertaken 
without authority only in instances in which the actor alters the 
writing of another, whereas no other conduct culpable under the 
statute requires such showing. In this case defendant was 
charged and tried under subsection (l)(b) which does not require 
5(...continued) 
[The Court]: Sustained. 
(T. 108-9)-
6The futility of escape was demonstrated by Smith's employees 
preventing defendant's remaining male companion from running off 
(T. 67-68, 119). 
-12-
a showing of unauthorized conduct as an express element of the 
crime of forgery (R.6 and 62). 
While the State was not required to show that defendant 
acted without Cotner's authority in order to satisfy an express 
requirement of section 76-6-501, the State was required to show 
that defendant acted with intent to defraud. Such proof 
necessarily entailed showing that defendant could not have 
believed, at some level, that in writing a check on a stranger's 
account she was acting innocently. In carrying that burden, as 
argued above, the State necessarily refuted defendant's defense 
that she naively and in good faith relied on O'Neill's apparent 
authority.7 
POINT II 
THE EXCLUSION OF CUMULATIVE TESTIMONY WAS 
WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND WAS, 
AT MOST, HARMLESS ERROR, SINCE THE WITNESS 
WAS NONETHELESS ALLOWED TO GIVE THE SUBSTANCE 
OF THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY, AND SUCH TESTIMONY 
COULD NOT HAVE PROVED DEFENDANT'S INNOCENT 
STATE OF MIND. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, allows the exclusion 
of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially 
7
 Defendant argues that the State did not meet its burden of 
disproving her alleged reliance on O'Neill's assertions of 
authority, citing State v. Wood, 648 p.2d 71 (Utah 1981), for the 
proposition that the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the 
existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once 
the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense. Id., at 82 
n.7. The State's proof of defendant's intent to defraud 
necessarily involved the refutation of defendant's alleged 
reliance. The jury was entitled to believe the State's witnesses 
and to disbelieve defendant and her witnesses. Further, 
defendant's alledged reliance on another's apparent authority is 
not an affirmative defense. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to -308 
(1990). Thus Wood has no special application to this case. 
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the juryf or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." (emphasis added). In Utah, Rule 403 evidentiary 
decisions are left to the trial court's discretion and are not 
overturned "unless the abuse of discretion is so severe that it 
results in a likelihood of injustice." State v. Knowles, 709 
P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. McCardle, 652 P.2d 
942, 944 (Utah 1982)). "The [trial] court retains considerable 
latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in rejecting that 
which is cumulative." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 
(1974). 
In this case, defendant attempted to offer the 
testimony of Jeff Phillips as to the substance of O'Neill's 
statement about her alleged right to use the stolen checkbook (T. 
137). The trial court sustained the State's objection on the 
ground that such testimony was cumulative (T. 162-63). "Evidence 
is cumulative when it replicates other admitted evidence. . . . " 
United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 643 (1983). The evidence 
which defendant sought to elicit from Phillips was cumulative in 
that it was merely intended to r€*plicate defendant's testimony 
previously offered on the same point (T. 108-09, 137 and 162). 
Utah law gives the trial judge wide discretion on the 
admission of Rule 403 evidence. See Knowles, 709 P.2d at 312. 
Utah courts have also specifically ruled on the admission of 
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cumulative evidence, giving the trial court broad power to admit 
or exclude. See State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988) 
(admission of prosecutor's letter would have added nothing to 
facts heard by jury); State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 
1989) (defendant's extended cross-examination of ex-wife properly 
denied where defendant allowed to introduce evidence of ex-wife's 
bias). "In the case of cumulative evidence, the trial judge 
clearly must have wide discretion to exclude if he is to conduct 
a trial efficiently." 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 403:97-98 (1990). 
In this case the trial court properly excluded 
Phillips's testimony because it was merely duplicative of 
testimony that defendant had already given about what O'Neill had 
told defendant about her alleged right to use the checkbook. 
Even if the trial court abused its discretion and 
should have admitted the evidence, the error was nevertheless 
harmless because both defendant and Phillips were allowed to 
testify to the substance of the point defendant desired to make. 
In State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980), the trial court 
erroneously excluded the defendant's testimony on a crucial point 
as hearsay. At a later point in the trial, however, the 
defendant testified without objection to the equivalent of the 
earlier excluded testimony. The court held that any error in 
excluding the testimony was cured when the equivalent testimony 
was later admitted. .Id,, at 337-38. "In short, defendant had the 
benefit of the evidence which at one point was excluded but was 
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later admitted. There was no prejudicial error committed in the 
exclusion of evidence by the trial court.M Ibid. 
In this case defendant was allowed to testify as to the 
substance of O'Neill's statement concerning the use of the 
checkbook. More importantly, Phillips, while precluded from 
testifying on the same matter, was nonetheless allowed to state 
that O'Neill had made a statement about the checkbook in 
defendant's immediate presence (T. 137-138). In the context in 
which Phillips delivered that testimony a jury might reasonably 
have considered that defendant's recollection of O'Neill's 
statement was accurate8. 
Defendant argues that under United States v. 
Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984), the exclusion of 
Phillips's testimony cannot be considered harmless error. In 
Eisenstein, the defendant sought to admit the corroborative 
testimony of his attorney to prove that the defendant had in fact 
given full disclosure to the attorney and had relied on advice of 
counsel in ignoring currency disclosure laws. Ld. at 1542-43. 
The testimony was excluded on hearsay grounds. The Eleventh 
Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that the exclusion was 
harmless as being merely cumulative of the defendant's testimony 
on the same point where the defendant's credibility on a crucial 
point was at issue. J[d. at 1546. 
8
 Also, as in Sorenson, defendant "did not make a proffer that 
indicated the evidence [she] sought to introduce went beyond the 
fact . . . as admitted in subsequent testimony." JId. at 338 n.7. 
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Notwithstanding the holding in Eisenstein, "[i]t is 
always within the discretion of the trial judge to deny a party 
the opportunity to present cumulative evidence bearing solely on 
credibility." United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 834-35 
(6th Cir. 1982) (corroborative testimony of witness vouching for 
the credibility of another witness had only minor "incremental 
probity" and thus properly excluded)(citations omitted). See 
also State v. Johnson, 79 Utah 263, 267, 9 P.2d 186, 187 (1932) 
(limitation of defendant's direct examination of corroborative 
witness not error where defendant permitted to give substantively 
similar evidence); accord State v. Mivahira, 6 Haw. App. 320, 
327, 721 P.2d 718, 722 (1986). 
This case is distinguishable from Eisenstein. There the 
defense was based entirely on defendant's being able to establish 
that he had made full disclosure to his attorney upon whose 
advice he then relied. Thus the attorney was the best witness to 
the crucial fact of defendant's disclosure. In this case 
Phillip's testimony did not have equivalent value because, at 
best, it only corroborated that defendant and Phillips heard the 
same statement. However, it could not have proved with any 
assurance defendant's state of mind, because defendant herself 
testified first that she was skeptical of O'Neill's right to use 
the checkbook and then, immediately thereafter, following her 
counsel's guiding hand, that she had gotten the impression that 
O'Neill had been able to use the checkbook. (See Appellee's Brief 
at 11 n.5). Thus, in the face of such equivocal testimony the 
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jury might well have believed that O'Neill made a statement about 
her use of the checkbook, but it would necessarily have been 
uncertain about the effect of such statement on defendant's state 
of mind. 
In sum, Phillips's excluded testimony could not have 
had a substantial impact on the jury* In Worthen, commenting on 
testimony of dubious value, the court stated: 
In actuality, the opinion would have added 
nothing to the facts the jury heard. The 
jury was, of course, able to evaluate the 
evidence by itself, and there is no evidence 
in the record that the jury was misled by not 
hearing the prosecutor's testimony or knowing 
about the relevant part of the letter. 
Id. at 849 (emphasis added). 
POINT III 
THE CHECKBOOK WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AS 
RELEVANT, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD. ANY PREJUDICE 
THAT MIGHT HAVE RESULTED FROM ITS ADMISSION 
WAS CURED BY THE STATE'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH THEFT AND 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REINFORCING 
THE POINT. 
At trial defendant objected to the admission of the 
checkbook, State's exhibit 4, from which she wrote the check in 
question (T. 80). The trial court admitted exhibit 4, ruling 
that it was relevant to the determination of defendant's state of 
mind (T. 81-5). Defendant contends that exhibit 4 should have 
been excluded because no connection was made between her actions 
and the checkbook as a whole (T. 85). The contention is without 
sufficient merit. 
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Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines relevant 
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." See Worthen, 765 P.2d at 846 ("not highly 
persuasive" letter tending to show defendant abusive nonetheless 
admissible under rule 401). Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
states, in pertinent part, that "[a]11 relevant evidence is 
admissible" unless it is excludable under another rule. In 
admitting evidence under rule 402, the trial court is not 
reversed unless it has abused its discretion. Terry v. Zion's 
Corp. Mercantile, 605 P.2d 314, 322-23 (Utah 1979). 
In this case no such abuse took place. Mental state is 
rarely susceptible to direct proof and generally must be proved 
by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 
558 (Utah 1985); State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 
1983). The checkbook was in the defendant's possession when she 
was detained at the supermarket (T. 66). Cotner, the owner of 
the check, testified that a signature other than her own had been 
made next to her signature on a voided check in the checkbook (T. 
78). Defendant was in possession of the entire stolen checkbook 
which allowed her to study Cotner's genuine signature even if she 
did not actually practice it. Lastly, officer Snow testified 
that defendant told him O'Neill had given her the checkbook with 
the suggestion that defendant also try to "pass" some checks 
around town (T. 92). Defendant's possession of the checkbook does 
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not by itself prove that the defendant had the requisite purpose 
to defraud, but it clearly tends to establish as more probable 
than not that defendant acted with intent to defraud. Thus the 
checkbook meets the requirement for relevant evidence under rule 
401 and is admissible under rule 402. 
Defendant argues that even if possession of the 
checkbook was relevant to reveal her state of mind, its probative 
value was outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury" under rule 403. 
The basis of defendant's argument is that the admission of the 
checkbook "may have misled or confused the jury into considering 
facts of crimes not at issue or alleged by the State." 
(Appellant's Brief at 16). The argument is insufficient. 
In first evaluating the* probative value of defendant's 
possession of the checkbook in evidencing her state of mind it 
must be recognized that the burden was on the State to prove 
defendant's culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) & (2)(b) (1990). In this case it was 
necessary for the State to marshal all circumstantial evidence 
which tended to show that defendant had acted with the requisite 
culpable state of mind. Defendant's possession of the checkbook, 
with all that such possession connoted, was a necessary part of 
that showing. 
As to unfair prejudice, defendant has failed to 
identify just how the admission of the checkbook has unfairly 
prejudiced her or unfairly influenced the jury. Cotner was 
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allowed to testify, without objection, that the purse containing 
the checkbook had been missing since the day before the incident 
in question and that defendant was unknown to her and did not 
have her authorization to use the checkbook (T. 76-79). Cotner 
also testified, again without objection, that one of defendant's 
male companions was the same man whom she had seen in the store 
where she last saw her purse (T. 77 and 88-89). As to the 
checkbook itself, it was far less related to any conjecture the 
jury might have formed about defendant's possible relation to any 
theft than was the aforementioned testimony. Thus, in the face 
of defendant's failure at trial to object to, or raise as an 
issue on appeal as to, testimony suggesting defendant's possible 
relation to a theft, defendant's allegation that the admission of 
the checkbook was prejudicial is without substance. In any 
event, any prejudice resulting from the admission of the 
checkbook was amply cured by the State's notice to the jury, in 
closing argument, that "[defendant's] not charged with theft of 
this checkbook. She's not charged with anything other than 
passing this check." (T. 159). The trial court's jury 
instructions stated, in pertinent part: "You are to be governed 
solely by the evidence introduced in this trial;" followed by, 
"You should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial, unless such statement was made as an 
admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or 
facts." (R. 54 and 67) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court 
effectively reinforced the State's acknowledgment that only 
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defendant's guilt for forgery was at issue. The trial court also 
instructed the jury that "[t]he law forbids you to be governed by 
mere . . . conjecture." (R. 54). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt instruction 
submitted to the jury was inadequate in light of the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision, Cage v. Louisiana, 111 
S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990). This Court has previously approved the 
precise instruction given in this case after having considered 
the directives of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson/ 774 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1989). State v. Pederson, 802 P.2d 1328 ( Utah Ct. App. 1990) (a 
copy of the instruction is attached hereto as Addendum B). 
However, defendant contends that the jury instructions 
in Cage v. Louisiana and the instant case are so similar that the 
instruction must necessarily be construed to be invalid. In 
support, defendant asserts that both instructions "have a 
presumption of innocence clause," both require acquittal if the 
state does not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
both state that reasonable doubt need not be proven to an 
absolute certainty, both define a reasonable doubt as one based 
on reason and one that a reasonable person would entertain, and 
both disallow a reasonable doubt to be one that is merely 
fanciful, imaginary or wholly speculative (Appellant's Brief at 
17-18 n.6). However, none of these aspects of the instruction 
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were found to be constitutionally defective in Cage, and 
defendant's own jury instruction also includes each of these 
clauses (a copy of defendant's proposed instruction is attached 
hereto as Addendum C). Defendant does not assert that his 
proposed instruction is defective pursuant to Cage, and his 
skewed attack on the instruction given by the trial court must 
fail. 
Cage condemned the combined use of phrases equating a 
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial 
doubt," and "moral certainty." The combination of this 
terminology, even when viewed in the context of the- instructions 
as a whole, allowed for a "finding of guilt based on a degree of 
proof below that required by the Due Process Clause." Cage, 111 
S. Ct. at 329-30. But, these terms were not used in defendant's 
case. Therefore, Cage has no applicability to the instant 
instruction. Accord State of Idaho v. Rhoades, 1991 WL 15607 
(Idaho Feb. 13, 1991); Lord v. State of Nevada, 1991 WL 13535 
(Nev. Feb. 7, 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this A day of April, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, comple-
tion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or ut-
terance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent 
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in 
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method 
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or iden-
tification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to 
be: 
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing is-
sued by a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
PART 3 
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
76-2-301. Person under fourteen years old not criminally 
responsible. 
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before he 
reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the 
jurisdiction of or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state. 
76-2-302. Compulsion. 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribe! 
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not 
have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable 
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a 
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the' presence of her hus-
band, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion ex-
cept as in Subsection (1) provided. 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creat-
ing a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not other-
wise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threat-
ening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is 
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on 
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defen-
dant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made 
at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit 
a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall 
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at 
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be 
appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is 
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a 
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for 
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrap-
ment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal 
law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense. 
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a violation of Section 
76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a 
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-404.1; or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the actor 
mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of age or older at the time of the 
alleged offense or was unaware of the victim's true age. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a viola-
tion of Section 76-5-401, or an attempt to commit that crime, that the actor 
mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older at the time of the 
alleged offense or was unaware of the victim's true age. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 88, ! 2. 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influence of 
alcohol or other substance voluntarily consumed 
— Definition. 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the 
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense. 
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as "in-
sanity" and "diminished mental capacity." 
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected 
alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged 
offense is not excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental 
illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may 
be a congenital condition or one the result of injury or a residual effect of a 
physical or mental disease. Mental illness does not mean a personality or 
character disorder or abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal con-
duct. 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication. 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless 
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an ele-
ment of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence estab-
lishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of 
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for 
that offense. 
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior to offense. 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an actor's criminal 
responsibility arises from his own conduct or from being a party to an offense 
under Section 76-2-201 [76-2-202] that prior to the commission of the offense, 
the actor voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commis-
sion and either: 
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities or 
the intended victim; or 
(2) Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in the commission 
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses. 
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative defenses. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV, 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent unless that defendant is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If you have a reasonable 
doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. The burden is 
upon the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The statefs evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does not require proof to 
an absolute certainty. 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
women would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in this case. Depending upon the circumstances, 
possibilities may create a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, 
reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or 
imaginary, or is based upon a wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and eliminates all 
resonable doubt. A determination that a defendant has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason, 
impartiality and common sense. You must have greater assurance of 
the correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in 
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life. The reason 
for this standard is that you cannot undo your verdict once you have 
announced it. 
In your personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to undo or 
modify the consequences of decisions you make. 
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